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developed in which risk-averse workers are faced with job-related 
uncertainty and labor turnover is costly. If a worker is unlucky and 
suffers a bad job match, he quits and joins another firm, hoping 
that he will like its work environment more. Because the quality of 
a job match is unobservable, workers cannot insure against the risk 
of a bad match. The firm provides implicit insurance against job 
dissatisfaction, typically by paying workers more than their net 
marginal products in their early years with the firm and less 
subsequently. Since the probabilities of the insured-against events 
(the quit rates over time) are affected by the amount of such 
insurance provided, this implicit insurance is characterized by moral 
hazard. Individuals quit when in the absence of insurance they 
would not. The equilibrium contract balances out efficiency in risk 
bearing with efficiency in turnover incentives. We show that the 
equilibrium contract is not (constrained) efficient and indicate why. 
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This paper is concerned with the relationship between wage structure 
and labor turnover. We are concerned, in particular, with the question 
who effectively pays for specific training and hiring costs. Becker (1962) 
provided the classic solution for this problem when individuals and 
firms are risk neutral.' Individuals pay the costs when they are hired, 
but the wages (which equal the posttraining value of their marginal 
product) that they are subsequently paid must be sufficiently high for 
the individuals to recoup these expenditures (with interest). Under these 
circumstances, individuals have the correct incentives for moving; when 
they move, their specific human capital is, in effect, destroyed; hence 
they should only move when the increase in their productivity, or the 
increment in the utility they receive from the nonpecuniary aspects of 
the job, at least compensates for this; when individuals have paid the 
training costs themselves, and when their current wages fully reflect 
their total productivity (including the increment in their productivity 
resulting from their specific training), then they will move only when it 
is efficient o do so. 
On the other hand, when individuals are risk averse, this wage 
structure imposes a heavy, undesirable risk on workers. It means, in 
particular, that if, for one reason or another, individuals have to move 
or find it desirable to move, they must bear a large loss. Assume, for 
instance, that there are important nonpecuniary aspects of a job that 
individuals only find out about after paying for their specific training 
costs. If the individual finds out he is badly matched, efficiency requires 
that he move; but the entire risk of whether the individual is well or 
badly matched is borne by the worker. Since workers are more risk 
averse than firms, this distribution of risk bearing is clearly inefficient. 
There is thus a trade-off: the firm can bear some part of the training 
costs, lowering the wage of the trained worker below his marginal 
productivity (to pay for the training); but to the extent the firm does 
this, individuals will not have the correct incentive to move. Workers' 
productivity exceeds their wages; they move whenever the expected 
increment in nonpecuniary benefits is enough to offset any wage 
differences; but this means that some of the time they will actually move 
to a job for which the increment in nonpecuniary benefits is not enough 
to compensate for the differences in productivity. 
If there were perfect information and it were costless to write complete 
contracts, the contract would specify the conditions under which indi- 
viduals could leave or the compensation that they would have to provide 
the firm if they leave under each specific set of circumstances; such 
' The seminal paper on the topic is Becker (1962). Subsequent papers that have 
extended and formalized Becker's analysis (e.g., Parsons 1972; Hashimoto 1978) 
have assumed that workers are risk neutral. 
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contracts (though they might be interpreted as forms of indentured 
servitude) would ensure economic efficiency. But perfect information 
does not exist, and it would be hopeless to attempt to write such 
complete contracts. The firm thus must design its wage contracts to 
balance these two considerations: efficiency in labor turnover versus the 
efficient distribution of risk bearing. 
We have just described an example of a wide class of problems that 
have recently been discussed-called "moral hazard" problems. They 
arise whenever the provision of insurance affects individuals' incentives 
(see Pauly 1974; Marshall 1976; Arnott and Stiglitz 1982; Stiglitz 1983). 
It has long been believed that the private balancing of the trade-off 
between risk bearing and incentives would lead to an efficient contract: 
though obviously workers may be worse off and profits may be lower 
than they would be with first-best insurance, still given the inherent 
information problems, there may be no government intervention that 
would effect a Pareto improvement. 
This paper has, then, two objectives to characterize within a simple 
general equilibrium model: the equilibrium contract, and to show that 
the market equilibrium is not in general Pareto efficient; there do, in 
general, exist government interventions that would improve welfare. 
The intuition behind our results on the inefficiency of the decentralized 
market equilibrium contracts can be seen as follows. Consider two firms, 
the second of which hires the workers that quit the first. Both offer 
long-term contracts with implicit insurance. The second firm, in deciding 
what contract to offer, will ignore the effect its contract has on the 
proportion of workers who quit the first firm. This would not matter in 
a first-best economy. But here workers who quit are being subsidized. 
Thus the second firm fails to take into account that its actions affect he 
profitability of the first firm. The phenomenon entails a form of 
externality that causes the competitive equilibrium to differ from the 
constrained optimum. 
It turns out that this line of reasoning is correct, as far as it goes, but 
incomplete. Consider first the case where utility is intertemporally 
separable. There externalities operate only via workers' savings. To see 
this, perturb the second firm's contract in such a way that it offers 
slightly more insurance while staying on its budget constraint, and hold 
workers' first-period savings fixed. A worker will quit the first firm if 
his expected utility from quitting exceeds his utility from staying. The 
perturbation does not affect his utility from staying; nor, since the second 
firm's contract has been chosen to maximize profits, does it affect his 
expected utility from quitting (i.e., the envelope theorem applies). Thus, 
when workers' first-period savings are fixed, the perturbation does not 
affect he first firm's quit rate or, therefore, its profitability. But in fact, 
the perturbation will affect workers' first-period savings; savings are a 
form of self-insurance and will be influenced by the amount of insurance 
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offered by the second-period firm. The change in a worker's first-period 
savings will, in turn, alter his utility from staying and expected utility 
from quitting. Thus, the perturbation with savings variable will influence 
the first firm's quit rate and profitability. Consider next the case where 
utility is not intertemporally separable and where workers' first-period 
savings are again fixed, and perform the same perturbation. It will cause 
workers with the second firm to alter their consumption programs; 
because the utility function is not intertemporally separable, this will 
affect workers' propensity to quit the first firm. The argument presented 
in the previous paragraph also fails to recognize that the types of market 
failures that arise depend on the characteristics of capital markets.2 It 
does, however, correctly identify the central issue whether, in this 
context, competitive markets will efficiently handle the trade-off between 
risk bearing and incentives. 
The argument above suggests that the equilibrium set of employment 
contracts in a 2-period economy may be efficient. The second firm, 
which hires workers who have quit the first firm, employs these workers 
for only I period. It has no choice but to set the wage equal to net 
marginal product. The uninternalized externalities between the two firms 
identified above are therefore inoperative. They do, however, arise in an 
economy of 3 or more periods. 
I. The Model 
We employ the same model, with slight modifications, throughout he 
paper. A single numeraire commodity is produced according to a single 
technology, which exhibits constant returns to scale to the sole factor, 
labor. The risk-averse workers are equally productive and have the same 
utility function with respect to income and job satisfaction. They differ, 
however, in what they like and dislike about a particular job; some 
enjoy rotating shifts, others do not; some enjoy Musak on the job, others 
do not; and so on. Firms are competitive and risk neutral. They offer 
different work environments; some have rotating shifts, others do not; 
some have Musak, others do not; and so on. At the time a worker joins 
a firm, he does not know what the firm's work environment is like, nor 
can the firm judge ex ante which workers will enjoy the particular work 
environment it offers. Thus, when joining a firm, a worker is uncertain 
how much he will enjoy his work environment (or, synonymously, what 
his level of job satisfaction will be with the firm, or what the quality of 
the job match will be). This is the only kind of uncertainty in the 
2 Just as firms provide insurance to their workers, if capital markets are 
imperfect, firms can profit by setting up an implicit capital market, paying 
workers more than their marginal products when their marginal utility of income 
is high and less when it is low. Thus wage profiles will depend on the nature of 
risk and capital markets available lsewhere in the economy. 
438 Arnott/Stiglitz 
economy. While workers' tastes vis-a-vis the work environment differ, 
they are symmetric in the sense that the probability distribution of a 
worker's job satisfaction when the starts employment with any firm is 
independent of both the firm and the worker. A worker quits a firm if 
doing so increases his expected utility. The replacement of this worker 
by another entails a fixed cost to the firm. 
The qualitative characteristics of the set of equilibrium employment 
contracts depend on the information technology. We assume that the 
firm knows a worker's employment history at the time he joins the 
firm,3 but cannot ascertain his job satisfaction while he is with the firm. 
A worker, meanwhile, has full information on the contracts offered by 
all firms, but does not know, at the time he joins a firm, how much he 
will enjoy his job. Finally, the firm can acquire insurance-relevant 
information concerning its workers at a substantially lower cost than 
can any agent external to the firm. 
Before presenting the model formally, we comment on some of its 
characteristics and on the role played by some of the assumptions. We 
have chosen the assumptions to provide as simple as possible a general 
equilibrium model with multiperiod employment contracts, labor mo- 
bility, moral hazard, and incomplete insurance markets. The qualitative 
results to be derived will clearly generalize to more complex and realistic 
economies. 
1. The firm is unable to observe a worker's job satisfaction, but it can 
observe whether or not he quits. Suppose that full insurance were 
provided against job dissatisfactiono. When asked about his level of job 
satisfaction, the worker would have an incentive to lie; specifically, he 
would state that his job satisfaction was the lowest possible consistent 
with his observed behavior. In fact, there is no efficient method of 
information revelation. The firm can do no better than offer quit 
insurance; thus, insurance markets are incomplete. Since the provision 
of quit insurance affects the probability of the insured-against event, 
moral hazard is present. And with moral hazard, if an insured's total 
insurance purchases are observable, an insurance contract will specify 
both premium and payout. We assume that the firm provides insurance 
implicitly by setting each period's wage above or below the marginal 
product.4 
2. An important characteristic of our economy is that a firm must 
break even on the insurance policy it offers each group of workers who 
3 The same qualitative results would obtain if it were assumed instead that the 
firm knows only the worker's age or years or employment at the time he applies 
for a Job. 
4 More complex contracts are possible (see Arnott and Stiglitz 1981). Treating 
them would complicate the analysis and not alter the qualitative results. 
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join the firm with a particular employment history. Cross-subsidization 
is not possible. Suppose it were otherwise and a firm could use the 
profit from the insurance provided to a lucky group (e.g., 50-year-olds 
who had only one previous job) to subsidize the insurance provided to 
an unlucky group (e.g., 30-year-olds who had already had five previous 
jobs). If another firm were to offer a slightly more attractive policy to 
the former group and a less attractive one to the latter, it would attract 
only the former group, thereby making a profit. This implies an 
analytically convenient definition of a firm, which we adopt, as a group 
of workers in some job who had the same employment history when 
they started the job.5 
3. We assumed that firms are identical and that workers are identical 
in all relevant respects, except those related to the quality of a job match, 
in order to circumvent the adverse selection problems that would 
otherwise arise. These problems have been treated in Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1976). Abstracting from adverse selection not only simplifies an 
already complicated analysis, but also allows us to ascribe the market 
failures we identify to moral hazard. 
4. The moral hazard problem facing the firm is as follows: if it offers 
more insurance, it bears more of its workers' job match risk, but it also 
experiences a higher quit rate. The former effect decreases the firm's 
costs, since workers are willing to take a reduction in average pay in 
exchange for some insurance; the latter effect, however, increases costs, 
since workers who quit are subsidized. The firm will trade off these two 
effects o as to maximize profits. 
The social optimum entails a similar trade-off. Increasing the amount 
of insurance offered reduces worker risk, which is beneficial, but causes 
excessive turnover, which is harmful. 
The central question is, Will a competitive conomy be at the optimal 
point on the worker risk/quit-rate trade-off rontier? 
II. The Analysis 
For reasons that we have suggested, some of the sources of market 
failure we identify do not arise in a 2-period economy. The results for 
the 3-period economy do, however, generalize, and this is the case 
we treat. 
In our 3-period economy, we allow a worker three possible employment 
histories. A worker may stay with the same firm for all 3 periods of his 
5If we introduced such realistic complications a the imperfect substitutability 
of workers in production because of differences in their mix of skills, and 
economies and diseconomies of scale and scope, we would obtain firms that 
contained eterminate numbers of workers of different types. All we require for 
the sources of market failure we identify to be operative is that there be some 
interfirm obility. 
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working life. Or he may quit the firm he started with after 1 period and 
stay with the next firm for the remaining 2 periods. Or he may work 
for a different firm for each of the 3 periods of his working life. We 
exclude by assumption the possibility that a worker will stay with his 
first firm for 2 periods and then join another firm for the third period; 
this simplifies notation and does not affect any qualitative results. With 
our definition of a firm, there are as many firm types as employment 
histories. We shall define a type 1 firm to be one that hires workers 
when they first join the labor force; a type 2 firm, one that hires workers 
who have quit a type 1 firm after working for it for 1 period; and a 
type 3 firm, one that hires workers who have quit successively type 1 
and type 2 firms. Thus, a type 1 firm hires workers at the beginning of 
the first period, a type 2 firm hires workers at the beginning of the 
second, and a type 3 firm hires workers at the beginning of the third. 
The following notation is employed: 
w' the wage offered by a firm of type j during the ith period of a 
worker's life; 
0' the job satisfaction ofa worker in a firm of type j; 
O' the lowest level of job satisfaction for which a worker will stay 
with a type j firm; 
0, the job satisfaction ofa worker in period i; 
f[0O] the density function of 0', with F [0'] the cumulative density 
function (throughout the paper we use square brackets to enclose 
the arguments of a function); 
s, cumulative saving of a worker employed by a type j firm at the 
end of the ith period of his working life; 
U[*] utility function; 
T' the costs to a firm of type j of hiring and training a worker 
ci consumption of a worker in period i; and 
m marginal product of labor. 
We make the following simplifying assumptions: 
i) For each employment history, workers are indifferent between wage 
streams with the same present discounted value (PDV) of wages. We 
term this the perfect capital markets case.6 (Later we shall comment on 
how our results are modified when capital markets are imperfect.) 
6 We may say that capital markets are imperfect when (and only when) 
workers are concerned about the timing of their income. This is not a primitive 
definition (we hope to derive one in subsequent work) but in the context of the 
paper will suffice. According to this definition, capital markets are imperfect if 
borrowing or lending rates differ, or if the individual is constrained in the 
amount he can lend or borrow. Imperfect capital markets may arise because of 
regulations or the nature of the transactions technology (e.g., administrative costs 
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ii) f [0']> 0 for 01 E (-oo, oc) and is continuous. 
iii) U[.] = z$_1(u[cd] + Oi), and u[ ] is strictly concave and twice 
differentiable. Utility is additively separable in consumption and job 
satisfaction, and over time.7 Furthermore, job satisfaction is measured by 
. . its utility. 
iv) The expected job satisfaction from a random job match is zero. 
v) In his first period with a firm, a worker must make his consumption 
decision before finding out his job satisfaction.8 
vi) The interest rate is zero. 
We shall proceed first by characterizing the worker's choice problem, 
then solving for the (constrained) optimum in which the planner has the 
same information as firms. Finally, we shall solve for the competitive 
equilibrium and compare it with the planning solution. 
A. The Worker's Problem 
At the beginning of the first period of his working life, the worker 
must decide how much to consume. Then, having discovered how much 
he likes his job, he must decide whether or not to quit at the end of the 
period and join another firm. If he decides not to quit, his future 
decisions are simple; because of the concavity of uz ], he will equalize 
second- and third-period consumption. 
If, instead, he decides to quit at the end of the first period, he must 
decide how much to consume during the second period. Then, when he 
finds out the quality of his job match with the second firm, he must 
decide whether to quit at the end of the second period. In either event, 
his third-period consumption is determined as a residual. 
Under our assumptions, the worker will quit at the end of the first 
period if his job satisfaction is below some critical level 0'. Similarly, a
worker who joins a second firm will quit that firm at the end of the 
second period if 0 is below 02. 
As usual, the intertemporal maximization problem may be set up in a 
number of different ways. It turns out that for our purposes it is most 
in borrowing and lending, the absence of financial assets). More interestingly, 
they may also result from informational asymmetries; for example, capital 
markets will typically be imperfect when there is a finite probability of default 
and when this probability can be affected by actions of the borrower that cannot 
be observed at reasonable cost by the lender; this is, of course, an example of 
moral hazard. That perfect capital markets are not inconsistent with our model 
is argued in Arnott and Stiglitz (1981). 
7 These assumptions result in a worker's choice of employment contract being 
dependent on his employment history, but not directly on his job satisfaction 
history. 
8 Relaxing this assumption complicates the analysis by making consumption 
dependent not only on employment history, but also on realized Job satisfaction, 
and does not alter the qualitative results of the paper. 
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convenient o treat the worker as choosing the amounts to save and the 
critical levels of job satisfaction below which to quit (i.e., sO, s ', 01, and 
02) so as to maximize expected utility. In making this choice, the worker 
takes the parameters of the employment contracts offered as given. If 
firms of the same types are offering different contracts, he will choose 
the contract that maximizes his expected utility. 
A worker's expected utility is calculated as the probability that he will 
stay with the same firm for 3 periods times expected utility conditional 
on this employment history, plus the probability that he will quit his 
first firm and stay with his second firm for 2 periods times expected 
utility conditional on this employment history, plus the probability that 
he will work for different firms in each of the 3 periods times expected 
utility conditional on this employment history. 
The probability that a worker will stay with the same firm for all 3 
periods is the probability that first-period job satisfaction exceeds 01, 
1-F[01]. Expected utility is J3=(I(u[ci] + EO3). With this employment 
history, Cl = I- s, C2 = C3= (w2 + w3 + s1)/2, and EOi = (fi2 
X O'dF[Ol]) . (1 -F[O']) for i = 1, ..., 3. Since it is only the sum of 
w2 and w3 that matters to the worker, we set w= w. Thus, expected 
utility contingent on this employment history is 
00 
J- O'dF[0l] 
uawI - sI] + 2u [I w] +3 F[O'] 
Proceeding similarly for the other two employment histories, we obtain 
EU = u[wl - sI] + 2(1 - F[ 2 + 2 O'dF[O'] 
+ F[O'](U[w2 + sI - s2] + (1-F [02])U[w2 + s2] + f 02dF[02] (1) 
+ F[02]U[w3 + S2]). 
Letting Mu denote the utility of a worker in period i when with a firm of 
type j and 'us' the corresponding marginal utility of consumption, we 
may write the first-order conditions of the worker's problem as: 
SI:-(lu') + (1 - F[O1])(1u') + F[O1]( 2u') = 0; (2a) 
S2: F[01](-(2U') + (1 - F[02])(2u') + F[02](3u')) = 0; (2b) 
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01: f'[1]{ -2((1u) + 01) + (2U) + (1-F[02])(2u) 
(2c) 
+ J 02dF [02] + F[02](3u)} = 0; 
02: F[0I]f[02]{-((2U) + 02) + (3U)} = 0. (2d) 
Equations (2a) and (2b) state that the worker will save so as to equalize 
the expected marginal utility of consumption. Equations (2c) and (2d) 
state simply that the worker will quit if doing so increases his expected 
utility. On the basis of (2a)-(2d) and the budget constraints contained in 
(1), we can express the worker's savings and quit decisions as functions 
of the wage vector 
SI= SI[WI, WI, w2, W2, W3] (3a) 
2= s2[w, wI, w2, W2, w3] (3b) 
01 =OI[WI, WI, W2, W32, W3] (3c) 
02 = 02[WI, wI W2, W32, W3]. (3d) 
B. The Planner's Problem 
We assume that the planner has the same information as the collectivity 
of firms and can do no better than control wages.9 Since there are perfect 
capital markets, all that matters to a worker is the sum of wages for 
each of the three possible wage histories. We could therefore characterize 
the planner's problem as the choice of these three wage sums to maximize 
expected utility, subject to an overall resource constraint. But doing so 
would make it difficult o compare the planning solution with the 
competitive quilibrium. We have chosen instead to treat the planner as 
selecting the wage vector {w'}. Since there are only three wage sums 
but five wages, we should be able to specify two additional constraints 
9 If the planner were able to do so, and we have implicitly assumed that he is 
not, he could do even better by intervening innot only the labor market but 
also the capital market. (This point is made in Diamond and Mirrlees [1978] in 
the context of the effect of social security on the retirement decision.) To see 
this, consider the case of perfect capital markets. If the government were to tax 
or subsidize savings (raise or lower the interest rate), this would alter the amount 
a worker saved. This in turn would, for a given set of wages, cause some workers 
to change their quit decisions and hence would alter the quit rate. We argued in 
the introduction that as a result of the moral hazard arising from the provision 
of quit insurance there would be "excessive" (more than in the first-best 
optimum) quitting. The government's adjusting the interest rate can reduce the 
amount of excessive quitting. 
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to the planning problem without shrinking the solution set. For reasons 
that will become apparent, we choose the following two constraints: 
w = (2 - F[02])m - _ (12-F [02])W 2 (4a) 
and 
w= m - T3. (4b) 
LEMMA 1. Adding constraints (4a) and (4b) to the planner's maximi- 
zation problem does not shrink the solution set. See Appendix A for the 
proof. 
The economy-wide resource constraint is 
w} + T1 + 2(1 - F[Ol])wl + F[01](T2 + w2 
+ (1 - F[02])w 2 + F[02](T3 + w3)) -3m = 0. (5) 
Subtracting (4a) and (4b) from (5) gives 
wI + T1 + 2(1 - F[0l])wl - (3 - 2F[01])m = 0, (6) 
which we write in compact form as 
A[wl, 01, W2; m, T1] = 0. (6') 
To further simplify notation, we write (1) as 
EU = EU[sl, s2, 01 02 w}, w2 wI , w? w3], (1') 
and (4a) as 
B(w2, 02 w32; m, T2) = 0, (4a') 
and we substitute out for w3 using (4b). Then the planner's problem is 
to maximize (1') with respect to (wi, wI, w2, w 2), subject to equations 
(4a') and (6'). Let X be the Lagrange multiplier on (4a') and 4 the 
multiplier on (6'). Then the Lagrangian of the planner's problem is 
L = EU+ XB + (A. (7) 
The corresponding first-order conditions are 
wijdEU dB dA w: +j X dB=?d=Q (8a) 
dwl dwl dwl 
w2: + X dB + 0~ dA 0 (8b) dw 1 dw 1 dw 1 
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2dEU dB dA 
W2 . + X + d) = 0, (8c) 2dw2 dw2 dw2 
and 
2 dEU dB dA W3: d2 dW2 + 2 (8d) d3 d3 d 3 
where dx/dy denotes the derivative of x with respect to y, holding other 
wage rates fixed but treating the dependence of sI, s2, 01, and 02 on y. 
Equations (8a)-(8d) state simply that the optimal wI, w2, w2, w23 is at a 
point in (w 1, wb w2, w2) space at which an indifference urve is tangent 
to the resource constraint's 
The planning optimum is therefore characterized by (4a'), (4b), (6'), 
(8a)-(8d), and (2a)-(2d). 
The variable X is the social benefit in utiles from the planner's 
receiving $1.00 per worker employed in type 2 firms from outside the 
economy; 0 is the corresponding social benefit when the planner receives 
$1.00 per worker employed in type I firms. It follows that 
X= F[01]0. (8e) 
Equivalently, the economy's resource constraint may be written as A + 
F[01]B = 0, a result we shall use below. 
C. Characterization of the Competitive Equilibrium 
A type 3 firm has no choice. It must pay workers the value of their 
marginal product, w3 = m - T3. 
A type 2 firm chooses w2 and w2 so as to maximize its profits ubject 
to providing workers with the competitively determined utility level. 
This utility level will adjust until in equilibrium firms make zero profits. 
Thus, we may view the firm instead as maximizing a worker's utility, 
subject to its zero profit constraint, which is given by (4a) or (4a'). In 
performing this maximization, it takes w' and wl as fixed since it treats 
the equilibrium contract offered by type I firms as exogenous. We 
assume that a type 2 firm gets a random group of workers who have 
quit type I firms. As a result, a single type 2 firm by itself can influence 
neither the first-period savings of its entering workers nor the quit rate 
of the firms from which they come, and will therefore treat s} and 01 as 
fixed. It will, however, recognize that its choice of w2 and w2 affects its 
workers' second-period savings and quit decisions. 
10 As pointed out in Arnott (1982), there may be multiple local optima to the 
planner's and firm's maximization problems. Depending on the path of adjustment 
to equilibrium, a competitive conomy could find itself at an inferior optimum. 
This is another potential source of market failure. 
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Thus, a type 2 firm's problem is to maximize (1') with respect to 
{w23, w} and subject to (4a'), treating s', 0', wl, w as fixed. Where X is 
the Lagrangian multiplier on (4a'), the Lagrangian of the type 2 firm's 
problem is 
L = EU + 1B, (9) 
and the corresponding first-order conditions are 
28EU 8B 
W2 6 + 0 =? (1 Oa) 8 2(ia 
and 
28EU 81? 
W3: 2 =0 (lOb) 
W3 83 
where the 8x/8y denotes the derivatives of x with respect to y, holding 
other wage rates and s} and 01 fixed, but treating the dependence of s2 
and 02 on y. 
A type 1 firm acts as if it chose wI and w to maximize a worker's 
expected utility, subject to the zero profit constraint, which is given by 
(6) or (6'). In performing this maximization, it takes w2 and w2 as fixed, 
since it treats the equilibrium contract offered by type 2 firms as 
exogenous, and O1, 02, s}, and s2 as varying with wl and wl according 
to (2a)-(2d), since it realizes that its contract choice will affect its 
workers' first- and second-period savings and quit decisions. Where X is 
the Lagrange multiplier on (6'), the Lagrangian of the type 1 firm's 
problem is 
L = EU+ A, (11) 
and the corresponding first-order conditions are 
1 dEU XdA 
WI.di+ ~ ~ dw 0, (1 2a) 
and 
dEU ~dA 
W2:d + d = O. (12b) dwi dw 1 
The competitive quilibrium is therefore characterized by (4a'), (4b), 
(6'), (i0a), (lob), (12a), (12b), and (2a)-(2d). 
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D. Comparison of the Competitive Equilibrium 
and the Planning Optimum 
To provide a thorough treatment of the comparison would greatly 
lengthen the paper and generate little additional insight. For this reason, 
we concentrate on what we term the normal case, for which, at the 
social optimum, 
3m - T1 > w1 + 2w' > wI +W2+W2> wI +W2+W3 
> 3m -T - T2- T3 
m> wl > m - T1, and m> W2 > m - T2. In the normal case, workers 
who stay with the same firm throughout heir working lives receive a 
sum of wages that is higher than if they were to quit once or twice, but 
lower than their net marginal product. Workers who quit twice during 
their working lives receive a sum of wages that is lower than if they 
were to quit only once or not at all, but higher than their net marginal 
product. Furthermore, both type 1 and type 2 firms provide partial 
insurance against quitting, in the sense that these firms cover only part 
of the worker's hiring costs. 
The normal case will certainly obtain when the TP's are large and 
workers are only slightly risk averse. Because the Ti's are large, 3m - T1 
> 3m - T1 - T2 > 3m - T1 - T2 - T3 (where > indicates much 
larger than); and because workers are only slightly risk averse, m > wI 
> m - T1 and m > 2 m - T2 (where > indicates only slightly 
larger than), which together imply (13). 
LEMMA 2. In the normal case at the social optimum, (?u') < (Iu') 
< (2u') and (2U') < (2U') < (33U). 
For the normal case, the sum of wages when a worker quits once, 
wI + w 3 + w2, exceeds the sum of wages when the worker quits twice, 
W I+ W2 + W3 . Thus W32 > W3. Now c2 = s2 + w2 and C3 = S2 + W3. 
Hence C2 > C3, which implies (3U t) > (2Ut'). From (2b), the worker chooses 
s2 to equalize the second-period and expected third-period marginal 
utilities of consumption, implying (3Ut) > (2U ) > (32U'). 
The proof of the first inequality is similar. For the normal case, the 
sum of wages when a worker never quits, wI + 2w exceeds that when 
he quits once, wl + wI + w2. Thus, 2w > w2 + w2. Now 2c' 
=2w' + s' and c +c3=w+ + sw+ . Hence, 2c >c +c2. From 
above, c2 > C2. It follows that cI > c2, and therefore (IU') < (2U '). From 
(2a), the worker chooses s' to equalize the first-period and expected 
second-period marginal utilities of consumption, implying (lu') < 
(1u') < (2U'). We can now establish 
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PROPOSITION 1. In the normal case, at the social optimum, competitive 
type I firms will (locally) want to offer additional insurance. 
Proof. Hold w' and w3 at their socially optimal levels, and plot in 
(w25, W) space: (i) the social optimum, P; (ii) the indifference contour 
going through the optimum, EU; (iii) the true resource constraint, R; 
and (iv) the budget constraint perceived by type 1 firms, A. Since type 1 
firms correctly perceive the indifference ontour (recall that they correctly 
determine how workers will adjust their savings and quit decisions in 
response to changes in wl and w'), then to prove the proposition, we 
need to demonstrate (in terms of fig. 1) that immediately above P, A lies 
above R. 
Let superscript p denote evaluation along the resource constraint, and 
let c denote evaluation along the budget constraint perceived by com- 
petitive firms. 
Recalling that A = 0 is the type 1 firm budget constraint, we have 
dA 
(dw}C__ dw'2 
(d@, )= _ tdA2 ) (i) 
dwl/ 
The social calculation, however, takes account of the fact that changes 
in w} and w affect he costs incurred on type 2 contracts as well. We 
demonstrated earlier that the planner faces the budget constraint F[01]B 




FIG. I.-The competitive type I contract provides "too much" insurance 
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F dB dA 
w2 p F[01] dB + dA i 
dw( dwi d 
It must be the case that (dEU)/(dw}) > 0 and (dEU)/(dw ) > 0. From 
(8a) and (8b), it follows that both the numerator and denominator of 
the term in brackets on the right-hand side of (ii) are negative. And 
using the results from lemma 2 and those presented in Appendix B, it 
can be shown that (dB/dw}) < 0 and (dB/dw ) > 0-raising w} increases 
the costs associated with type 2 contracts but raising w lowers these 
costs. (The economics of these and other results will be explained in the 
next subsection.) Hence, (dA/dw 1)p tic 0, while (dA/dw1)p < 0. If (dA/ 
dw Dp < O, then 
(FO]dB d-A dA 
dw 1 dw 1 dwjl 
]dB dA < dA(iii) 
d 
+ 
I dw I dw I 
PP 
while if (dA/dw})p > 0, then (dw /dw')p > 0 and (dw}/dw2)p < 0. In 
either case, at the social optimum, competitive firms would want to 
increase wI and decrease w2, thereby providing more insurance. Q.E.D. 
We have drawn in the indifference curves and the budget constraints 
in figure 1 as having standard curvature properties. However, there may 
be multiple local optima. For this reason, the statement hat type 1 firm 
contracts provide too much insurance is local. 
The result in proposition 1 occurs because, for type 1 firms, the 
private costs of providing insurance are less than the social costs. We 
shall explain this result in the next subsection. Proposition 1 has an 
immediate 
COROLLARY. In the normal case, the competitive quilibrium set of 
employment contracts is Pareto inefficient. 
PROPOSITION 2. In the normal case, at the social optimum, competitive 
type 2 firms may want to offer either more or less insurance. 
Proof. The proof is analogous to that for proposition 1. Competitive 
type 2 firms again correctly perceive the indifference contour. Proving 
the proposition therefore again entails comparing the slopes of the 
resource constraint and the budget constraint perceived by type 2 firms 
at the social optimum, but this time in (w2, w2) space. From (4a'), the 
slope of the budget constraint perceived by type 2 firms is 
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/B2 ( dw~ \C__ 8w3 
t~w3}p 8B , (i) 
2w2 p 
while the slope of the resource contraint is 
dB dA 
kd W0 dB dA (ii) 
After a great deal of tedious manipulation, it can be shown that 
-(dw2 dw2) p may be either larger or smaller than -(dw2/dw2)c. Q.E.D. 
These are the basic analytical results. More detail is provided in Arnott 
and Stiglitz (1981). 
E. The Causes of Market Failures: The Normal Case 
Let us suppose that w2 and w2 are at their socially optimal values and 
investigate why a type 1 firm would choose a socially inefficient 
employment contract (w', wD). 
Consider the firm's calculations with respect to raising w1, holding 
w2 constant. The firm will take w2 and w2 as fixed. When it raises wl 
it causes the worker to alter his savings behavior, changing both s' and 
2 s2. It can be shown that 
49S 2 2([01])2 [OI]f [02](22U1)(lut 2 
=( 
2 
ul> O. awl A 
where A is the determinant of the Hessian corresponding to (2a)-(2d) 
and is positive. As one would intuitively expect, in response to an 
increase in w 1, the worker will increase his consumption in every period, 
whatever his employment history, and c2 and C3 are increased by 
S22 increasing s2. Now, this increase in s2 makes workers more willing to 
quit type 2 firms. In particular, from (2d), with w3 and W3 fixed, (d02/ 
ds2) = (3u') - (3U') > 0 (using lemma 2). In response to their increased 
quit rates, type 2 firms will be forced to offer a less attractive mployment 
contract in order to restore budget balance. In taking w2 and W3 as 
fixed, type 1 firms ignore this and hence underestimate the social cost 
of raising wI. 
Now consider the firm's calculations with respect to lowering w2l 
holding wl constant. It can be shown that 
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Os2 2F [0']2f [02]f [0](2u) {-(I -F[1])(") + f [O1] [(2u') -(IU)](I U) 
aw2 A 
< 0. 
Suppose that the worker responds to the fall in w2 by reducing c' by 
the full amount of the fall and holding all other {c,}'s at their original 
level. This would increase (lu'), and to restore equality between the first- 
period and expected second-period marginal utilities of consumption, 
the worker would have to decrease first-period consumption and increase 
first-period savings. It can in fact be shown that (Oas'/aw') < 0; thus, in 
response to the fall in w', workers joining type 2 firms will have more 
savings. As a result C2, C3, and c' will rise, which requires that s2 rise. As 
we have seen, this increase in s2 forces type 2 firms to offer a less 
attractive contract. Hence, type 1 firms overestimate the social saving 
from lowering w'. Putting these two results together, we have that type 
I firms, by ignoring the effects of their contract changes on the 
profitability of type 2 firms, will set w} higher and w' lower than is 
socially optimal (in a local sense). This entails offering excessive insurance. 
We term this uninternalized externality, the forward-directed externality. 
We argued earlier that when the utility function is intertemporally 
separable, which we have assumed, this externality operates exclusively 
via workers' savings. To check this, let us retrace the argument of this 
subsection holding workers' savings fixed. Raise w}, holding w2 w2, 
and w3 fixed. The increase in wI alters neither the budget constraints of 
type 2 firms or the characteristics ( avings, tastes) of its entering workers. 
In consequence, workers will respond in the same way as before to type 
2 contracts, and type 2 firms will have no incentive to alter the contracts 
they offer. The same argument applies to the fall in w . When the utility 
function is not intertemporally separable, the past, present, and future 
are linked not only via savings but also directly, through the utility 
function. 
We now turn to the type 2 firm's calculations. We shall not go 
through the algebra but instead shall just outline the sources of market 
failure. There are two of them. First, each type 2 firm, because it receives 
a random selection of workers, treats sl as fixed. However, all type 2 
firms together alter sl through the contracts they offer. And s in turn 
affects 02. Thus, type 2 firms collectively ignore the effect of the contracts 
they offer on their own quit rates, which operates via first-period savings. 
We term this the sideways externality, because each type 2 firm ignores 
the effects of the contract it offers on s and hence on the profitability 
of all other type 2 firms. Second, type 2 firms fail to consider that the 
contract they offer affects the profitability of type 1 firms and hence the 
attractiveness of the contracts they can offer. This market failure, too, 
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which we term the backward-directed xternality, operates via workers' 
savings. 
The forward- and backward-directed externalities are examples of 
what we have termed elsewhere (Arnott and Stiglitz 1982) the "seemingly 
unrelated events market failure," which stems from moral hazard. We 
shall now give an example of this market failure and then show how 
the problem at hand is analogous to the example. Suppose that there are 
two statistically independent sets of states of nature. One set influences 
the probability that one's housing will burn down, the other that of an 
automobile accident. Because of asymmetric information (i.e., the insurer 
can observe the outcome or event, but neither the underlying state of 
nature nor the insured's accident-prevention effort) insurance is provided 
against the two events rather than against the underlying states of nature, 
and both forms of insurance are, as a result, characterized by moral 
hazard. Suppose, furthermore, that an individual purchases insurance 
against one accident from one agent and against the other accident from 
another. The provision of insurance against his housing's burning down 
may cause the individual to drive less carefully, thereby increasing the 
probability of an automobile accident. In this case, the provider of fire 
insurance ignores in his calculations that by providing more fire insurance 
he affects the profitability of the contract offered by the provider of 
automobile accident insurance. Put alternatively, the private cost he 
perceives in providing an extra unit of insurance will in general differ 
from the social cost; as a result, he provides the wrong amount of fire 
insurance. The two agents fail to take into account this interdependence 
between the insurance contracts they offer. 
In the problem at hand, the two statistically independent risks are the 
qualities of two job matches for the same worker, one corresponding to 
a job earlier in his career, the other to a later job. The interdependence 
comes about through saving. The firm that employs the worker early in 
his career fails to take into account that the contract it offers, by 
influencing the amount the worker saves, will in general affect the 
profitability of the firm that employs the worker later in his career. 
Similarly, the latter firm fails to take into account that the contract it 
offers will in general affect he profitability of the former firm. 
As we suggested earlier, the corresponding 2-period economy is 
efficient. In such an economy, there are type 1 and type 2 firms. Since 
type 2 firms hire workers for only 1 period, they have no choice but to 
pay workers their net (of T) marginal products. Since type 2 firms have 
no discretion, they cannot affect he profitability of type 1 firms. Nor is 
their own profitability affected by the type 1 contract. 
F. Imperfect Capital Markets 
It is difficult o make general statements about how our results are 
altered when capital markets are imperfect, because there are so many 
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possible causes of imperfection and so many forms of imperfect capital 
market. One can, however, identify additional sources of market failure 
to which imperfections in capital markets may give rise. First, borrowing 
and lending (whether this is done explicitly by banks or implicitly by 
firms)11 results in another market failure of the seemingly unrelated 
events variety: The borrower or lender will ignore the effect of his 
actions, through their effects on worker savings, on the profitability of 
other firms. Second, loans may be characterized by moral hazard; if they 
are, and if a worker can borrow from different agents at different points 
in time, or from more than one agent at a point in time, there will be 
forward-, backward-, and sideways-directed externalities analogous to 
those discussed in the previous subsection. 
Third, a qualitatively different market failure may arise, which we 
term "the cross-subsidization market failure." Recall that with perfect 
capital markets, workers were concerned with only the sum of wages 
associated with each of the three employment histories, and that this 
allowed us to set two wages arbitrarily in the planning problem. The 
competitive quilibrium had three budget constraints, one for each firm 
type, while the planning problem had only one resource constraint. But 
these two extra constraints in the market problem ''did not matter," 
since the planning problem had the two degrees of freedom noted above. 
With imperfect capital markets, however, the worker is concerned not 
only with the sum of wages for a particular employment history, but 
with the timing of wages as well. In this case, the planning problem 
may have no degrees of freedom and the extra constraints in the market 
problem may "matter." The potential market failure arises because a 
planner can subsidize across firm types, but the market cannot; hence 
the term cross-subsidization market failure. The cross-subsidization 
market failure is particularly easy to see in the 2-period analogue to the 
3-period model treated in the paper. Suppose that expected utility takes 
on the special form 
EU = min(cl, c2, c2) + E01 + E02, (i) 
and that there is no borrowing, lending, or saving. Under competition, 
c2 =m - T2+ (ii) 
where i9 is the size of the subsidy to type 2 firms per worker they 
"This would entail paying workers more in periods when their marginal 
utility of consumption is high and less in periods when it is low. If younger 
workers are liquidity constrained, a firm will provide an implicit loan to younger 
workers that is repaid by older workers who stay with the firm. The older 
workers who quit the firm in effect default on their implicit loans. 
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employ, which is collected from type 1 firms. Suppose, furthermore, 




Thus, in this extreme example, a $1.00 subsidy payable to type 2 firms 
for each worker they employ increases every worker's utility from 
consumption by $1.00. 
In sum, while precise characterization will have to await further 
research, we assert with confidence that with imperfect capital markets, 
too, multiperiod employment contracts are inefficient. 
III. Concluding Comments 
A. Discussion 
The model can be generalized to N periods or to continuous time and 
our simplifying assumptions of a zero interest rate and of an intertem- 
porally separable utility function with unchanging tastes can be relaxed, 
and the same qualitative results obtained. 
Unfortunately, the policy implications of the market failures we have 
identified are far from clear. One cannot say a priori whether firms 
provide too little or too much insurance in their contracts,12 nor therefore 
a priori whether the government should tax or subsidize labor turnover. 
In principle, one could compute the optimal set of turnover taxes and 
subsidies for the economy treated in the paper, but the informational 
requirements to do this are unrealistically large. Thus, the market failures 
we have identified should be viewed as potential market failures; they 
warrant government intervention only if the costs of intervention are 
less than the benefits. Furthermore, one would expect the results to be 
substantially altered when the realistic complications arising with het- 
erogeneous workers, notably adverse selection problems, are considered. 
It is by now well known that in economies with incomplete markets, 
institutional structure "matters" and is endogenous. One should derive, 
rather than assume, who will provide insurance in what form, what the 
characteristics ofcapital markets will be, what form of market organization 
will arise, and so on. We have shown in a specific context that the 
12 We were able to obtain unambiguous results for type 1 firms. But type 1 
firms are special, since they hire workers who have made no prior economic 
decisions. 
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institutional structure generated by the market is (potentially) inefficient. 
Optimal corrective action may entail not only the conventional taxes 
and subsidies but also the regulation of institutional structure. To treat 
such considerations, a new welfare economics will have to be developed 
that is more sophisticated and complex, but at the same time more 
interesting and realistic, than the old. 
What might be a "Chicago economist's" defense of the market against 
our claim that institutions in a competitive conomy may be inefficient? 
He might point out that the externalities we have identified could be 
internalized by a superfirm that sets all wages and, in the case of 
imperfect capital markets, subsidizes across firms, and argue furthermore 
that the profit motive would lead to the creation of such a superfirm. 
This is an intellectually respectable defense, since there is nothing in our 
model to preclude the creation of such a superfirm. It is, however, a 
rather strange defense of the market that requires that there be one 
superfirm, which all workers must join for life. One wonders how the 
forces of competition would operate-potential entry by other superfirms 
stretches one's credulity-and whether such a superfirm would really be 
very different from a government. Furthermore, if we were to enrich 
our model to include many products, and economies and diseconomies 
of scale and scope (the diseconomies reflecting the costs of coordination 
and administration), we would find that the optimum entailed a group 
of superfirms. Competitive equilibrium would be characterized by all 
the market failures we have identified as long as there is any inter- 
superfirm mobility of labor. The Chicago economist would probably 
also stress that we have only identified potential market failures; we 
have acknowledged this point. 
B. Macroeconomic Implications 
In this paper we have focused on only one aspect of the contractual 
arrangements between workers and employers, albeit an important one. 
The contractual relationship has recently been the center of discussions 
attempting to explain wage rigidities and unemployment. Elsewhere, we 
have argued that at least the conventional forms of implicit contract 
theory do not succeed in providing very persuasive micro foundations 
for the theory of unemployment (Stiglitz 1984). Though in the presence 
of perfect information implicit contract theory explains wage rigidities, 
it does not explain unemployment: workers would still always work up 
to the point where the value of their marginal productivity was equal to 
their marginal rate of substitution between goods and leisure. More 
recent developments, focusing on imperfect information (see, e.g., Gross- 
man and Hart 1981), are equally unconvincing: the contracts typically 
analyzed entail there being less information than is reasonably available 
(the terms of the contract are not made contingent on variables, such as 
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the unemployment ra e or imports of cars, etc., which, if the informational 
problems on which they focus were central, they should be) and more 
information than is reasonably available (workers must know the total 
number of hours hired by the firm and, moreover, must monitor transfers 
of capital goods from the firm to other firms). Under plausible conditions, 
the contracts lead to overemployment rather than underemployment. 
Moreover, the contracts are not self-enforcing; to be enforceable, they 
must be explicit rather than implicit, and, in fact, we see few contracts 
of the indicated form. The theories do not explain either the patterns of 
unemployment (i.e., why there are differential unemployment rates 
among different groups) or forms of unemployment (i.e., why there 
should be lay-offs rather than work sharing). When there are lay-offs, 
the theories predict (again under plausible assumptions) that those laid 
off are better off than those who are retained (provided the firm provides 
optimal severance pay). Finally, though the theories provide an explanation 
of layoffs, they do not provide an explanation of unemployment, which 
must simultaneously explain layoffs and hiring."3 
The fact that these conventional developments of implicit contract 
theory have not provided a good theory of unemployment does not, of 
course, imply that the structure of the contractual arrangements between 
workers and their employers is not an important determinant of unem- 
ployment. Several extensions of our model can, we believe, provide at 
least part of the microfoundations of a theory of unemployment. 
It is easy, for instance, to construct a simple model of frictional 
unemployment, by having a multiperiod model in which there are lags 
between quitting and being hired and in which the expected duration of 
unemployment depends on search intensity. Such a model should give 
rise to a rather interesting set of additional market failures. When a 
13 The difference b tween our implicit contract theory and the standard implicit 
contract theories with asymmetric information should now be clear; both theories 
are, in a sense, based on incomplete information. (As we have argued, with 
perfect information, implicit contracts serve only to smooth demand and do not 
give rise to any unemployment.) The information problem on which the 
asymmetric information models have focused concerns the productivity ofthe 
firm. Risk-averse firms, wishing to reduce their wages in bad states, need to 
persuade the workers that the state is in fact bad; to do so, they agree that if 
they say the state is bad, they will reduce their employment below what it 
otherwise would be. Because the cost of reducing employment is greater in good 
states than in bad states, this restriction o  employment induces firms to say 
that it is a bad state only when it is in fact bad. We are concerned with 
information problems that arise whenever labor turnover is possible. These 
include problems associated with ascertaining the individual's assessment of the 
nonpecuniary benefits of the firm (in this paper), and ascertaining the individual's 
search intensity (in Arnott, Hosios, and Stiglitz 1982). 
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worker joins the unemployment pool, he imposes an externality on 
other workers by reducing the probability that an advertised vacancy is 
unfilled. Similarly, a firm, in advertising a job vacancy, imposes an 
externality on other firms by reducing the probability of their filling a
given job vacancy, and perhaps also by increasing their quit rates. 
Furthermore, when a firm chooses its wage structure, it ignores that its 
quit rate affects the size of the unemployment pool and that a larger 
unemployment pool may have positive ffects on the returns to recruit- 
ment by other firms. In addition, the insurance the firm provides against 
quitting has a moral hazard effect on worker search intensity, which 
may be harmful to other firms. Whenever a worker moves from one 
firm to another, the economy's worker-firm atching is altered. Thus, 
all of these unemployment-related externalities, a  well as the externalities 
noted previously, may be regarded as different forms of matching 
externalities, which have been discussed elsewhere in the literature. 
More central to understanding cyclical unemployment is he extension 
of the analysis to examine the effect of contractual rrangements on
responses to sectoral shocks. Contracts that provide good insurance l ad 
workers to move sluggishly from low- to high-productivity sectors. 
Firms recognize this in designing contracts; in particular, they recognize 
that the total cost of the implicit subsidy that they provide in bad states 
can be reduced if workers can be induced to leave. Workers-ex ante- 
recognize this and thus are willing to sign contracts that effectively 
commit hem (with some probability) to search in the bad state; the 
commitment ( he only enforceable commitment in this context) takes 
the form of a layoff (possibly with severance pay). Elsewhere Arnott, 
Hosios, and Stiglitz (1982) have analyzed the structure of these contracts 
in detail; that analysis provides better micro foundations for the theory 
of unemployment than existing models: the equilibrium contract may 
entail ayoffs as well as work sharing; the theory is consistent with well- 
defined patterns of who gets laid off (which are in accord with what is 
observed); and those who do get laid off are more likely to be worse off 
than those who are retained (in comparison with the paradoxical results 
of the standard models). 
Though the Arnott-Hosios-Stiglitz model may go some way toward 
developing a version of implicit contract heory that can provide part of 
the basis of a theory of unemployment, a still better theory would entail 
the integration of implicit contract heory with efficiency wage theory. 
Work on this is underway at present. 
C. Conclusion 
We have obtained a rather striking result for a particular model. 
Arrow (1965) and others have conjectured that when markets are 
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incomplete, institutions arise to fill the holes left by those absent markets 
in a manner that is efficient, given the transactions cost technology and 
information available. In our model, because of information asymmetries, 
complete insurance was not available against the underlying uncertainty, 
the quality of job matches. We argued that in these circumstances the 
accommodating institution that would arise is the firm's providing 
implicit insurance against quitting in the employment contract. We 
demonstrated that in these circumstances each firm's choice of contract 
affects the profitability of all other firms through worker savings. Because 
firms ignore this interdependence, there are uninternalized externalities 
that cause potential market failure. This result is a counterexample to 
Arrow's conjecture. If the source of market failure we have identified is 
general, the disturbing implication that follows is that the wide range of 
public, charitable, and private quasi-insurance institutions in existence 
are collectively inefficient. 
How general in fact are the sources of market failure we identified? 
They are generic, of a class we termed seemingly unrelated events, and 
they arise whenever the provision of insurance is characterized by moral 
hazard and individuals obtain insurance from more than one source. 
This is true whether the insurance is provided by insurance companies 
or the government or social institutions-fraternal nd charitable orga- 
nizations, family, friends, and so forth. Each provider of insurance will 
generally ignore that the insurance or quasi insurance he provides will 
affect he probability of accidents against which others provide insurance. 
The seemingly unrelated events market failures identified in this paper 
were of a special type that merit attention in their own right. Suppose, 
in a temporal economy, that the probability of an accident at a point in 
time depends, not only on the contemporaneous amount (flow) of 
insurance provided, but also on the value of some state (or stock) variable 
that is affected by how much insurance has been provided in the past 
and how much will be provided in the future. If different agents provide 
insurance over different periods, market failure will occur. Each agent 
will ignore the effect he insurance he provides has on the stock variable 
for periods during which he does not provide the insurance. In the 
model treated in the paper, this stock variable was savings. It could also 
be state of health, level of education, or work experience. This type of 
externality is internalized if a single insurer covers an individual through- 
out his life. To achieve this, either lifetime insurance would have to be 
provided by a third-party insurer external to firms (which could be the 
government), or else each individual would have to be employed by the 
same superfirm throughout his working life that would provide such 
insurance. The former solution suffers from the problem that information 
acquisition costs are typically higher for a third-party insurer than for 
Labor Turnover and Moral Hazard 459 
an individual's employer. The latter solution raises the issue of the 
compatibility of superfirms and competitive behavior. Both solutions 
rest on the assumption that individuals are perfectly informed concerning 
the menu of lifetime contracts offered. How these externalities are best 
treated when account is taken of incomplete information on the part of 
individuals is a topic that will have to await future research. 
Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1 
We may index employment histories according to the firm type a 
worker is employed with when he retires. Letting Wk denote the sum 
of wages associated with employment history k, we obtain 
W1 = wl + 2wL (Ala) 
W2 = WI + W2 + W32, A 1 2  ~~~~~(A Ib) 
and 
W3 = w + w+W. (Ac) 
We need to prove that any triple (W1, W2, W3) in the planner's solution 
set is also in the solution set when (4a) and (4b) are imposed as 
constraints. First, note that 02 may be viewed as a function of (W1, W2, 
W3). Next set 
wV2=W2-W3+m-T3 (AId) 
WI = W3- (3 - F1[02])m + T2+ T3 + (1 - F[02])w2, (Ale) 
and 
_(WI -WI) W I I (Alf) 
We assume that the utility functions and the exogenous parameters are 
such that the optimal { W4,} entails nonnegative {w,}. It is a straightforward 
matter to check that (4a), (4b), and (Ald)-(Alf) satisfy (Ala)-(Alc). 
Furthermore, from (4a), (4b), and (Ald)-(Alf), one can express each 
wage as a function of (W1, W2, W3) and exogenous parameters. Thus, 
for any (W1, W2, W3), there is a unique wage vector (wI, wI 
w2, w3, w3) satisfying (4a), (4b), and (Ala)-(Alc). Q.E.D. 
Appendix B 
Evaluation of Derivatives 
Total differentiation f (2a)-(2d) gives 
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